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Abstract
Strategic alliances in the container shipping sector, and requirements imposed by
consolidated hinterland modalities such as trains and barges, have resulted in
container terminals facing increasing pressures to cooperate to handle increasingly
intertwined container flows. However, concession agreements and market conditions
often also pressure terminals to compete. This paper aims to help understand how
pressures for competition and cooperation conflict, what problems this causes, what
drives these tensions, and how these can be resolved.
The drivers of port competitiveness are generally conceptualized as straightforward criteria
related to costs, efficiency, location, and infrastructure. Because of the focus on these ‘hard’,
quantifiable factors, the qualitative relational underpinnings of port performance are often
overlooked. This paper explores how inter-organizational relations function as a major
underpinning of port performance and competitiveness. Interviews with a representative
selection of stakeholders in the Port of Rotterdam reveal the problems that can occur
when cooperation between terminals is under pressure. These problems relate to
deficiencies in inter-organizational relationships, which do not tend to arise spontaneously
in a competitive context. This paper provides a framework that helps understand how
firms can simultaneously balance pressures for competition and imperatives for cross-firm
integration and cooperation. Several technical and organizational solutions are suggested,
but effective implementation depends on various tacit factors – including trust, shared
values, and a sense of community – that determine stakeholders’ willingness to commit
and cooperate.
Keywords: Ports, Port governance, Container terminals, Container transport, Inter-
organizational relations, Intra-port competition
Introduction
In Western Europe there is traditionally strong competition between several major
neighboring ports, in particular Antwerp, Rotterdam, and the German ports Hamburg
and Bremerhaven. This competition is generally recognized, but within container ports
themselves, there are also competitive dynamics that may in turn affect port perform-
ance and competitiveness.
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Container port competitiveness is generally conceptualized as driven by straight-
forward criteria, such as port costs, handling efficiency, hinterland connectivity,
and the quality of infrastructure and services (Parola et al. 2017). The more effi-
cient and cost-effective a port’s operations are, the better should be its competitive
position. The authors argue, however, that these ‘hard’, quantifiable factors cannot
be seen in isolation from the more tacit and qualitative relational underpinnings of
the way a port functions. On a deeper level, port performance itself – as evidenced
by conventional measures such as efficiency and throughput growth – critically
depends on the way in which port actors relate and interact in the logistics pro-
cesses taking place within a port.
Competition in the container shipping sector can be distinguished at the intra-
port level (e.g. between actors within one port competing for the same cargo) and
at the inter-port level (e.g. between different ports serving the same supply chains
and/or hinterland) (Verhoeff 1981; Haezendonck 2001; Wang and Zhang 2018). So
far, inter-port competition – between different ports competing for users’ business
– has received the most attention in the maritime and port economics literature
(e.g. De Langen and Pallis 2010; Figueiredo de Oliveira and Cariou 2015; Van Hassel et al.
2016; Lagoudis et al. 2017; Castelein et al. 2019). Intra-port competition – and
more broadly inter-organizational behavior within ports (including competition, as
well as cooperation and other configurations of interaction and mutual
dependence) have received relatively little attention, with some exceptions that do
address the complexities in relations between port actors (De Langen and Pallis
2006; Van der Horst and De Langen 2008; Hall and Jacobs 2010; Verhoeven 2010;
De Martino et al. 2013; Jaffee 2017). In addressing intra-port inter-organizational
relationships however, authors predominantly focus on the formal aspects of port
policy and governance (i.e. the position of Port Authorities and its relations with
port users, such as concession agreements) and deliberate stakeholder management
strategies of port authorities (Parola et al. 2018). Other studies have focused on
the more tacit dimensions of inter-organizational relations, but often between firms
that are not necessarily direct competitors (i.e. either vertically linked in the same
logistics chain or operating in different chains) (Van der Horst and De Langen
2008; De Martino et al. 2013, 2015; Jaffee 2017). Of particular interest is the ten-
sion that arises when direct competitors also face pressures to cooperate. Recently,
Clott et al. (2018) considered horizontal coordination within the liner shipping sec-
tor, and a series of recent papers explored the relatively new idea of cooperation
between competing seaports from various perspectives (see Notteboom et al.
(2018) for an overview). However, while the ostensible balancing act between com-
petition and cooperation has been researched for the liner shipping sector and
seaports, these dynamics at the intra-port level are of considerable practical and
academic interest as well, considering the often fierce competition between neigh-
boring terminals in contrast with their shared interest in the overall performance
of the port’s logistics functions. So far the tension between competitive and co-
operative relationships between directly competing neighboring container terminals
has not been researched yet. This study aims to explore this missing perspective by
analyzing horizontal coordination and cooperation between competing container
terminals in a seaport, based on a case study on the Port of Rotterdam.
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To function effectively as a transportation hub, ports should seamlessly integrate
various logistics chains and processes that pass through the port. This integration
may have to take place between processes of competing port users. Therefore, in
contrast to competition between port actors, earlier work has shown that there is
considerable pressure on firms in ports to engage in coordination and cooperation
to ensure the overall efficiency of port-oriented supply chains (Van der Horst and
De Langen 2008). Apart from cooperation to align and coordinate logistics pro-
cesses, also innovation processes in port clusters depend on the degree to which
(sometimes competing) organizations interact and cooperate (Acciaro et al. 2018).
The authors researching these issues conclude that cooperation often does not
arise spontaneously, and that the link between competition and cooperation within
ports deserves further scrutiny. This paper further engages with this challenging
question, and focuses on competitive dynamics and inter-organizational relations
within container ports to explore the challenges that may arise when terminal op-
erators compete directly, but also face pressures to cooperate.
The questions that need to be answered in this context are: What tensions may arise
when port actors have to balance the pressures for competition and cooperation? Secondly,
what factors drive this tension? And lastly, how may this tension be resolved?
These questions are addressed using insights from the fields of marketing, business
management, and supply chain management on how barriers to, and facilitators of,
supply chain integration work and can be managed. This is linked to the issue of how
firms can simultaneously manage cooperation and competition. These insights are
applied to the case of the Port of Rotterdam, where the importance of balancing com-
petition and cooperation and inter-organizational relationships has recently become
particularly relevant. In 2013, the terminals at the newly created Tweede Maasvlakte
port extension became operational, with the Port Authority paying special attention to
the competitive environment in their concession agreement policy as well as sustain-
ability concerns (De Langen et al. 2012; Notteboom and Lam 2018). In the context of
a declining freight market and overcapacity in the container-handling sector, relations
between terminals, and between terminals and the Port Authority, became strained.
One operator (Hutchison Ports ECT Rotterdam) even claimed €1.3bln from the Port
Authority in damage compensation for the perceived unfairness with which the Port
Authority granted concessions to new operators competing with the incumbent ECT
(Mackor 2014). Furthermore, hold-up and congestion at and between terminals in the
port of Rotterdam worsened, partly due to lack of inter-terminal coordination and co-
operation (Pieffers 2017). This example shows that when relations between terminals
become competitive to the extent that cooperation suffers, this has a direct negative
impact on port performance. When these issues persist for longer periods of time,
long-term port competitiveness suffers as well. For managers and policymakers, this
study offers deeper insights into the drivers of such problems, and possible directions
for solutions.
Drawing on publicly available information, information from industry publica-
tions, and interviews with decision makers from several different types of key
stakeholder organizations in the Rotterdam container transport sector, this paper
illustrates how the abstract notions of inter-organizational relations and supply
chain integration apply to the situation within a container port. Based on this case
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study, this article considers a) the problems that can arise when cooperation and
coordination fall short, b) the relational and institutional underpinnings of these
dynamics, and c) possible solutions.
In addressing these questions, the study contributes to practice as well as academic
discussions on several relevant issues. The relevance of the paper is that it outlines how
a port’s performance on important criteria – transit time, reliability and intermodal
connectivity – is jeopardized when terminals fail to effectively coordinate their activities
on the seaside as well as the landside. Tracing the institutional drivers of these coordin-
ation problems, the authors highlight the importance of inter-organizational relations
between supply chain actors (even competitors) for effective supply chain coordination
and ultimately port performance. This leads to recommendations for managers and
policymakers, based on technical and organizational solutions discussed in literature.
To academic research, the study contributes a missing perspective on coordination
within seaports. Earlier research in this area focused predominantly on vertical coordin-
ation in container ports (notably Van Der Horst and De Langen 2008), or horizontal
cooperation within the liner shipping sector (Clott et al. 2018) or between seaports
(Notteboom et al. 2018), whereas this study explores horizontal coordination between
directly competing terminals. Following a qualitative case study approach, the study
provides in-depth understanding of all aspects involved in an environment where com-
peting terminals also face pressures to cooperate, including port policy, the institutional
environment, terminal behavior, and the linkages between these. Moreover, the authors
link these intra-port dynamics to port performance and competitiveness. In doing so,
the paper contributes a unique and so far missing perspective to the academic discus-
sion, on a set of issues with an urgent relevance for practice. Deficient coordination
between competing terminals impedes the efficient transit of containers in the port area
and hence undermines port performance and competitiveness. As these dynamics are
the result of ingrained behavioral patterns driven by path-dependent institutional
contexts, the resulting problems are persistent. To help address these persistent prob-
lems of the sector and the seaport community, this study provides an in-depth under-
standing of the drivers of these problems, and outlines possible directions for their
alleviation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on intra-port
competition and port inter-organizational relations, and outlines the framework uniting
the concept of supply chain integration with competition and cooperation in business net-
works. Section 3 outlines the methodology used. Section 4 introduces the case study of
the Port of Rotterdam, illustrates how pressures for competition and cooperation create
problems for the port’s container handling industry, and identifies the institutional drivers
of these coordination problems. Section 5 presents recommendations on how to over-
come these problems. Section 6 discusses the findings, their implications for research and
practice, and some caveats. Section 7 concludes.
Literature overview and theoretical background
This section presents a background sketch of the business environment in container
ports, the pressures on port actors to engage in various types of interactions, and the
theoretical lens through which these issues are addressed in this study.
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The roles of a container terminal
This paper focuses specifically on the container handling sector in seaports. In a typical
container supply chain, containers are loaded on a deep-sea container vessel (some
with over 20,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) capacity) and shipped to some des-
tination (importing) port. Upon arrival, the containers are unloaded at the container
terminal contracted by the deep-sea carrier and from there transported to their destina-
tions. Transport to the port’s hinterland can take place via inland waterways by barge,
over rail by train, or over road by truck. Moreover, some containers are transshipped to
smaller destination ports in the hub port’s vicinity. For example, containers destined for
Scandinavia are often first shipped to larger hub ports in Northern Europe and subse-
quently transported to Scandinavia by feeder. Of course, in the case of exports, the
containers are transported from the hinterland on various modalities to the port and
subsequently loaded onto a deep-sea or short-sea vessel.
The processes occurring at an individual deep-sea container terminal are sum-
marized in Fig. 1.
The terminal can be divided into roughly three parts: the quayside (where ships
moor), the landside (where containers exit or enter through the terminal gate for
or from overland transport), and the stack or yard (where containers are stored
temporarily). For simplicity, the stack is omitted from Fig. 1, focusing on container
movements in and out of the terminal. The quayside in particular is a bottleneck
for container terminals (Carlo et al. 2015): they have a limited length of quayside
and a limited number of cranes to service ships. This requires them to balance
demands from deep-sea carriers and feeders that fulfill seaside functions, and
barges, that predominately fulfill landside functions towards the hinterland or
within the port. Another complication is introduced when, in ports with multiple
container terminals, the different operators all have to optimize their own landside
and seaside processes, while containers also have to be exchanged between differ-
ent terminals to end up on the designated deep-sea vessel or feeder.
In this context of demands for optimization and trade-offs in the terminal’s own op-
eration, and factors that require coordination with other parties, this analysis explores
how container terminals relate to one another and other parties in the port.
Fig. 1 Processes at and around a deep-sea container terminal. Source: Authors’ own elaboration
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Conflicting pressures
Container terminals in ports with multiple operators face two conflicting pressures,
namely, to a) compete with one another (intra-port competition), but also b) cooperate,
as they have a shared interest in the efficiency and competitiveness of the port in which
they are operating (relative to other competing ports).
Since the late twentieth century, Port Authorities in Europe have evolved from (mu-
nicipal) government agencies into more autonomous corporatized entities (Brooks
and Cullinane 2006; Borges Vieira et al. 2014). Ports may vary in the degree to which
the infrastructure, superstructure, port labor, and other functions are managed by
public and/or private actors. The World Bank (2007) specifies a typology of port gov-
ernance models, ranging from fully public to fully private, and two categories in
between. On this spectrum, they recommend the ‘landlord’ model of port governance:
an autonomous Port Authority granting land concessions to port users (in this case
competing terminal operators) in exchange for a concession fee and additional stipu-
lations ensuring that the broader societal goals, such as sustainability requirements,
of the Port Authority are also met (Notteboom and Verhoeven 2010; De Langen et al.
2012; Debrie et al. 2013).1
The pressure for intra-port competition stems from these dominant views on port
governance. When the port superstructure, labor, and other functions are left to market
actors, it is assumed that competition between port users with similar functions bene-
fits port efficiency and hence competitiveness (De Langen and Pallis 2006; World Bank
2007). Stevedoring activities within a port, including container handling, lend them-
selves well to natural monopolies, making it prudent for the Port Authority to actively
stimulate competition between various operators competing for the same cargo to
reduce costs and improve efficiency in the process (De Langen and Pallis 2010). For
most Port Authorities, this push for lower costs and higher efficiency is an imperative
in an environment in which ports compete for their position in increasingly fluid global
supply chains (Robinson 2002).
Juxtaposed to these pressures for competition, competing terminals within a port
have significant shared interests and several imperatives for cooperation. First, in
the alliance structure of the container shipping sector, carriers share capacity on
each other’s ships that call at different terminals, and thus containers have to be
exchanged between terminals for hinterland, deep-sea, or feeder transport. Sec-
ondly, hinterland transport by train or barge may require containers from different
terminals to be consolidated on one modality. In addition, because of sustainability
concerns and road congestion in port areas, some Port Authorities have already
started to demand that terminals transport a larger share of containers to the hin-
terland by barge and rail, instead of truck (De Langen et al. 2012; Van den Berg
and De Langen 2014). Thirdly, as shippers and carriers consider hinterland, short-
1Another restructuring has taken place in the terminal operating industry in the last decades, whereby the
management of container terminals has increasingly become concentrated in a handful of globally operating
terminal operating companies (TOCs) (Slack and Frémont 2005). This global management structure and the
shifting away of decision making from the local terminal to a global HQ has implications for the position and
behavior of individual terminals in ports. However, in attracting clients to their terminal in a given port, the
individual terminal has considerable discretion that makes competition between individual terminals at the
port level a justifiable focus: different terminals of the same TOC may have different client portfolios, and
similarly carriers may call at terminals from competing TOCs (in different ports or even in the same port).
For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that terminals operating in the same port are exposed to
similar institutional pressures that drive the inter-organizational relationships between these terminals.
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sea, and deep-sea connectivity and service reliability as major port choice criteria
(Martínez Moya and Feo Valero 2017; Parola et al. 2017), it is in the interest of all
stakeholders in the port that these processes run smoothly and reliably, or else the
port risks losing its position in these supply chains (Castelein et al. 2019). The
integration of various processes and activities between actors is an essential under-
pinning of the efficiency and competitiveness of the port cluster overall (Lavissière
and Rodrigue 2017).
The integration imperative
The terminals’ interest in cooperation stems from a need to integrate logistics pro-
cesses within a port to strengthen the port’s efficiency and competitiveness. Supply
chain integration is defined as “a firm’s objective to attain operational and strategic
efficiencies through collaboration among internal functions and with other firms”
(Richey et al. 2010, p. 238). In the port context, this concretely entails a “pressure
for seamless integration and rapid transit” (Jaffee 2017, p. 732). Considering supply
chains as linear constellations, this integration requires the alignment of the trans-
fer of containers from carrier to terminal to hinterland transporters to its destin-
ation. However, in more complex supply networks, logistics integration in seaports
may also require coordination of container movements between terminals, either in
more complex transshipment arrangements or in the consolidation of cargoes from
various terminals on one hinterland modality (i.e. barge or train). To some extent,
these issues are addressed in existing research on synchromodal transport (Van
Riessen et al. 2015), but relational barriers to integration and synchronization have
received scant attention in the literature.
This concept of integration – and factors that can enhance or impede it – de-
serves further attention. Barriers to integration include lack of trust, failure to
understand the importance of integration, fear associated with losing control, misa-
ligned goals and objectives, poor information systems, short-term as opposed to
long-term focus, and supply chain complexity issues (Moberg et al. 2003). Richey
et al. (2010) distill these barriers down to three dimensions: unwillingness to share
information, preference for keeping other parties at arm’s length, and an internal
focus (i.e. on sub-optimizing the firm’s own processes to the detriment of processes
across firms and the overall performance of a chain or cluster).
Other factors may function as facilitators of integration. These include “inter-
organizational teams, developing new performance measures, improving communication
and information exchange [and] a ‘united front’ [ …] to develop a level of commitment
among cross-company members of an alliance” (Richey et al. 2010, p. 241). These facilita-
tors work on five dimensions, namely, alignment, communication, structure (risk,
rewards, and cost-sharing schemes), quantification (of performance measures), and
interdependence.
This brief overview shows that facilitators of integration depend to a great extent
on the relations between organizations in the chain, horizontal as well as vertical.
Bad relations, evidenced by a lack of trust and an inward-looking focus, impede in-
tegration, whereas good relations, evidenced by communication and shared values,
facilitate integration.
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The value generated in a supply chain is created through exchanges between organi-
zations. In Allee’s (2008) ‘value network’ (opting for the network rather than the chain
metaphor) approach, tangible exchanges include the exchange of goods and money
within a network, whereas, more interestingly, intangible exchanges can entail every-
thing from coordination, planning and process knowledge to support, trust, expertise,
or affiliation. The key takeaway is that these exchanges create value not only for the
recipient, but also for the network overall – an insight that readily applies to terminal
operators in a port. However, the extent to which these exchanges arise depends on the
strength and quality of the relations between the organizations in the network.
Port inter-organizational relations
Although the ‘landlord’ model of port governance is the most common in Europe,
local implementations of this model vary between institutional contexts, resulting
in considerably different governance structures and positions of Port Authorities
(Ng and Pallis 2010; González Laxe et al. 2016). Debrie et al. (2013) argue that
port reform constitutes an evolutionary process in which the realized reform is
always a compromise between a formal and deliberate reform attempt (i.e. a gen-
eric governance model) and bottom-up forces that facilitate, resist, or redirect these
reform attempts. These forces are shaped by the local institutional context, the bal-
ance of power between public and private stakeholders, the distribution of local de-
cision-making power, and local market conditions.
Port inter-organizational relations between competing terminals are driven by a
similar dialectic process. On the formal and deliberate side, Port Authorities and
government actors impose formal rules and requirements on terminals, and employ
stakeholder management strategies, aiming to stimulate healthy competition that
drives costs down and efficiency up, contributing to the performance and competi-
tiveness of the port. Additionally, emergent factors from the local context also in-
fluence port inter-organizational relations. Relevant factors for the local stevedoring
sector include the institutional environment (how do businesses, and particularly
competitors, relate to one another?), local freight market conditions (how much
pressure can clients put on terminals and take advantage of the presence of mul-
tiple competing operators in a port?), public–private relations (what path-
dependent dynamics are there in the relation between port operators and Port
Authorities?). Although port policy may prescribe a certain competitive structure,
the way port actors relate to one another is determined by these bottom-up
factors.
Competitive pressures may impose barriers to logistics integration between competing
operators. As discussed above however, other factors can mitigate these barriers and shape
a climate that is more conducive to cooperation. Analogous to Richey et al.’s (2010) notion
of a united front, Porter and Kramer introduced the term ‘shared values’ as a force that con-
tributes to the competitiveness of a cluster, such as the container handling sector in a port
(Porter and Kramer 2011). This theory attempted to show the way to connect business and
society (Vroomans et al. 2017). The concept of shared values resonates with a concept in-
troduced by Fukuyama (1995), namely the “belief system”, or the way people associate with
one another. If this belief is profound, one can assume that the shared values will be more
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present than when this belief is lacking. Such a shared belief system is necessary to enhance
trust between parties in a given system. Geerlings (1997) elaborates on this by stating that a
system that might enhance this interaction between people (or actors within a system) could
be described as an ‘economy of touch’: “… the informal contact that influences the manage-
ment structures and decision making processes” (Geerlings 1997, p. 97) – a crucial concept
for the relationships between and within government and the private sector. Lun et al.
(2016) explore the concept of social capital in this context: relationships and interactions be-
tween stakeholders that allow them to establish linkages, develop synergistic activities, and
facilitate collective action. The stronger these inter-organizational ties and relationships are,
the better they can be leveraged to enhance performance and generate added value for the
port cluster and the region.
Coopetition
Hall and Jacobs (2010) argue that inter-organizational relations in a port fall some-
where on the spectrum between competitive and collaborative. Too much of one is
never good: a too collaborative environment will lose efficiency because it lacks com-
petitive pressure, but too much competition can depress inter-organizational relations
to the point that necessary cooperation in certain areas is impeded. In terms of the
container handling industry, competition between a port’s terminals enhance efficiency,
but when competition and rivalry gets in the way of collaboration, this undercuts the
port’s performance.
This analysis takes a somewhat different perspective and explores how companies
may compete and cooperate at the same time, with both types of relations having
their own spectrum of intensity, independent of each other. While the tension be-
tween competition and cooperation may still be there, it can be alleviated in areas
where cooperation is desirable – hence this ostensible tension may be there, but it
does not have to be a given obstacle in all interactions. This type of two-faced re-
lationship is called ‘coopetition’ – a portmanteau of competition and cooperation
(Bengtsson and Kock 2000). Song (2003) and Heaver et al. (2001) have explored
this concept in relation to inter-port competition and Clott et al. (2018) for the
liner shipping industry, but it has particular relevance for the business environment
within ports as well. Competition and cooperation are driven by fundamentally dif-
ferent and even conflicting conceptions of how organizations relate to one another,
or “logics of interaction” (Bengtsson and Kock 2000), but a context of competitive
pressures and mutual dependence may require companies to engage in both.
Among container shipping companies, this is done through strategic alliances
(Panayides and Wiedmer 2011; Clott et al. 2018), but such global formal cooper-
ation agreements between competitors may not be feasible in the stevedoring in-
dustry, as, at port level, operators compete on the basis of local rules, customs,
and market conditions.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 outlined how companies within ports are competitors but
also have a shared interest in the port being able to integrate logistics processes ef-
fectively. Whether this integration occurs despite competitive pressures depends to
a great extent on the quality of inter-organizational relations. More formally, com-
peting terminals within a port would benefit from a coopetitive relation in which
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competitive and collaborative modes of interaction coexist rather than produce
friction.
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) outline two conditions for effective coopetition. First
they observe that, between firms that manage effectively to cooperate and compete
simultaneously, there are “clear norms of the interaction partly based on formal
agreement and partly on social contracts” (Bengtsson and Kock 2000, p. 419). Sec-
ondly, apart from this tacit understanding, they note that firms in a coopetitive
relation formally ensure that competition and cooperation never occur in the same
functional areas – e.g. firms compete for customers’ business in sales and market-
ing but cooperate in upstream activities, such as research and development (R&D)
and sourcing. By separating competitive and cooperative logics of interaction across
functional areas, there is no ambiguity about the nature of single employees’ or de-
partments’ interactions with other firms in the sector.
In the case of a container port, terminals can separate competition for carriers’ busi-
ness from cooperation in other aspects. Formally, this can be achieved by separating
functions internally, but, more importantly, Bengtsson and Kock (Bengtsson and Kock
2000) emphasize the importance of tacit norms and agreements within and between
firms that separate the contradictory logics of cooperation and competition and allow
firms to attain the best of both. In the interaction between actors at the intra-port level,
this may require attention for community building and the ‘soft’ elements of port man-
agement. These include shared values, trust, a sense of a united front, and a shared
vision on future port development.
This conceptual framework is used to address the study’s research questions on the
basis of a case study on the container handling sector in the Port of Rotterdam. First,
how does the tension between pressures for competition and for cooperation manifest
itself at the port level? Secondly, what formal and informal factors drive this tension?
Thirdly, how can this tension be resolved?
Methodology
To illustrate how these dynamics can be applied to understand coordination problems
in seaports, the situation in the container handling sector in the Port of Rotterdam –
the largest container port in Europe – is used as an illustrative case study. Apart from
publicly accessible information about the port’s recent developments, we draw on infor-
mation from interviews with key stakeholders. Between October 2016 and February
2017, we interviewed three representatives from the container terminal operating
industry, three representatives of the Port of Rotterdam authority, two representatives
of two major (top 10) container shipping firms, and three representatives of two major
freight forwarders (both top 3 global forwarders in terms of sea-freight volume). The
freight forwarders were selected as a category of respondents to represent cargo owners
(shippers). The majority of shippers tend to be small parties moving small quantities,
whereas forwarders deal with demands from the many cargo owners by whom they are
contracted and could therefore appropriately voice their perspective. Respondents were
selected on the basis of the different categories of stakeholders outlined above: we
wanted to speak with several representatives from each major category of port users
(shippers, carriers, terminal operators) and the Port Authority. Our criterion for ap-
proaching respondents within these organizations was that the respondents had to be
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directly involved in the organization’s strategic decision making. Each interview, lasting be-
tween 1 and 2 h, was conducted in a semi-structured format on the basis of general discus-
sion questions about the Port of Rotterdam’s competitive position and internal dynamics.
We also proposed several of our conjectures as formulated in section 2 as discussion points.
We agreed with our respondents beforehand that the conversations would not be re-
corded, as some of them preferred to make statements in a personal capacity rather
than as a formal representative of their company. Extensive notes were taken during
the interviews and later transcribed into interview reports – rather than verbatim tran-
scripts. Hence, it should be noted that the statements below are paraphrased rather
than quoted literally. In instances where it is not possible to obtain verbatim tran-
scripts, interview notes are generally accepted to be a sufficient alterative (Vogt et al.
2014). During the interviews, two of the authors were present, one in the capacity of
interviewer and the other as observer who could ask for clarification when needed.
The analytical approach to the findings from the case interviews is rooted in the ex-
ploratory nature of the question, namely how container terminals balance pressures for
competition and cooperation and why certain problems arise and persist (see Yin
2009). The section above sketched the important aspects of the case setting (terminal’s
operating environment and the conflicting pressures they face) and the conceptual
categories one should explore when considering supply chain integration and simultan-
eous cooperation and competition (theory on barriers and facilitators). Drawing on the
interview findings, the role and relevance of these concepts for the case can be
explored to a great level of qualitative depth and understanding of the mechanisms
involved. Using information from different sources serves to highlight complementary
aspects of the topic under study, while discrepancies between respondents can be
addressed by critically considering their positions and perspectives and juxtaposing
these. Ultimately, having identified the main relations and relevant concepts, the
recommendations from literature can be tailored to the case context.
To mitigate the potential inaccuracies arising from using written interview notes
only, a draft of this paper was presented to our respondents to verify whether their
viewpoints were represented accurately – as is good practice in qualitative case
study research (Yin 2009). As another validity check, we presented our conclusions
to 10 other, ‘out-of-sample’ experts from Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
asking them whether they recognized the findings, and whether any relevant ele-
ments were wrong or missing. These validity checks did not raise major issues or
omissions. The next section describes our findings.
Case study and findings
This section describes the case study of the container handling sector in the Port
of Rotterdam, identifies coordination problems between terminals, analyzes these in
terms of the framework outlined above, and discusses the institutional factors iden-
tified by port stakeholders as the main impediments to intra-port cooperation.
Case study background
The Port of Rotterdam is the largest container port in Europe. It is located along
the Hamburg–Le Havre range, which contains four of the 25 largest ports in the
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world, namely Rotterdam, Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Hamburg. Together these
ports handle the lion’s share of (Western) Europe’s container trade. Recently, the
port was extended with the Tweede Maasvlakte project – including the commis-
sioning of three new, fully automated container terminals – to facilitate a projected
throughput growth from 11mln to 33mln TEU per year by 2033.
The container terminals in Rotterdam – particularly those at the new Tweede
Maasvlakte – are considered to be state-of-the-art (De Langen et al. 2012). The
Port Authority – a corporatized entity owned by the municipality of Rotterdam
and the Dutch government – stimulates competition between container terminals
in the port to enhance efficiency, and at the moment three global terminal operat-
ing companies have one or more deep-sea terminals in the port, besides several
smaller operators focusing predominantly on short-sea and barge shipping. In the
1990s, APMT was invited to open a container terminal and compete with the in-
cumbent ECT (now part of Hutchinson Port Holdings), which previously had a
monopoly position in the port. When awarding concessions for the newly created
land at the Tweede Maasvlakte, ECT and APMT both obtained concessions for
additional terminals, and Rotterdam World Gateway, a consortium of DP World
and several liner companies, was attracted as a third large competitor within the
port (De Langen et al. 2012). The Port Authority maintains a strategy of non-inter-
ference and keeps the container terminals at arm’s length, emphasizing the
importance of free competition within the port (Vroomans et al. 2017).
When the terminals at the Tweede Maasvlakte were commissioned, more cap-
acity became available than was required in a generally depressed freight market.
This overcapacity was disadvantageous for all terminal operators, as their new
deep-sea quay acquisitions were not operating at full capacity, and their competi-
tive position vis-à-vis their clients is weaker. The relationship between the Port
Authority and the terminals, particularly ECT, became strained as a result (Van der
Lugt et al. 2014), even culminating in a court case in which ECT accused the Port
Authority of irresponsible decisions in creating the new capacity at the Tweede
Maasvlakte and demanded indemnification (Mackor 2014).
Integration problems arising from conflicting pressures
Our respondents identified several problems related to deficient cooperation between
the competing terminals. For an overview, the separate issues raised by the different
categories of stakeholders are listed in Table 1, with their direct consequences for port
performance indicated with arrows:
This inventory serves to give a well-rounded view of various coordination problems
that may arise between terminals within a port. Of course, if one actor did not mention
a certain problem, this does not necessarily mean that he/she does not perceive the
problem as relevant. Respondents may also refrain from mentioning a problem in
which they have a role. Nevertheless, by eliciting a wide range of stakeholder perspec-
tives and introducing additional validity checks, we aim to paint as complete a picture
as possible.
The key takeaway from these statements is that coordination problems between indi-
vidual terminals have a direct negative impact on key port performance indicators, such
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as transit time, service reliability, and hinterland connectivity. Our respondents af-
firm the conjecture that lack of coordination undercuts the competitive position of
the port overall. The forwarders we interviewed were most vocal about this issue:
for their clients, transit time is a critical decision criterion, as they operate on lean,
‘just-in-time’ inventory management strategies and have considerable amounts of
their cash bound up in merchandise shipments. Too much hold-up and uncertainty
in a port will – over time – make shippers consider moving their transport chains
through other ports. One forwarder stated that:
Particularly in Rotterdam, inter-terminal container exchange and consolidation of
cargo on hinterland modalities has become more problematic [ … ] The average
transit time for a container destined for Germany used to be three days, now it is
close to five [ … ] Terminals’ own processes and prioritization hurt port
performance [in terms of transit time] as well, in that they prioritize the deep-sea
calls over inland barge calls, sometimes jeopardizing the timely arrival of our clients’
export drops.
Another carrier representative added that “fragmentation of rail and barge cargo across
terminals is not dealt with adequately in Rotterdam due to lack of cooperation and infor-
mation exchange between terminals”, causing considerable hold-up. Generally, they note
– like the forwarders – that clients may switch to other ports if hold-up problems persist.
Having established the seriousness of the consequences of inter-terminal coordination
problems, these problems themselves deserve further scrutiny. From Table 1, these are
identified along the lines of ‘hold-up,’ ‘inefficiency,’ ‘uncertainty,’ and ‘unreliability.’
Regarding the locus of these problems, four rough categories of problems can be
distinguished:
– Hinterland barge (quayside)
– Hinterland rail (landside)
– Inter-terminal barge and feeder (quayside)
Table 1 Inventory of problems in inter-terminal coordination (and their effects on performance), as
identified by respondents
Forwarders Terminal operators Port Authority Carriers
Hold-up of barges
at terminal (deep-
sea lines
get priority)
➔ Containers may
‘miss the boat’
Uncertainty of container
arrival times at other
terminals
➔ Less efficient handling,
longer transit times
Hold-up problems regarding rail
and barge, modal shift towards
these modalities hard to achieve
➔ Large share of truck transport
to hinterland (more congestion
and environmental impact)
Inefficient exchange
of transshipment
containers
➔ Longer transit time,
containers may miss
their boat
Rail and barge cargoes
are not consolidated
efficiently between
terminals
➔ Longer transit times
Exchange of
transshipment
containers inefficient
➔ Longer transit time,
containers may miss
their boat
Hinterland rail and
barge connections
inefficient
➔ Longer transit times
Congestion at and
between terminals
(unreliable barge
service)
➔ Longer transit times
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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– Inter-terminal land transport (landside)
Several of Moberg et al.’s (2003) categories of barriers to chain integration can be rec-
ognized in the problems sketched.
First, there is the problem of sub-optimization: this is particularly visible regarding
barge transport (whether inter-terminal or hinterland transport). At terminals that do
not have a dedicated barge quay, barges moor at the same quay as deep-sea lines. How-
ever, with the deep-sea carriers being the only paying clients of container terminals,
and the risk of high demurrage costs with these calls, the deep-sea lines get priority in
quay and equipment allocation – to the detriment of barge servicing. Consequently,
the barge service becomes more unreliable, and shippers may find their containers de-
layed when “their ship [– literally –] has sailed”. The container terminal optimizes its
quayside resource allocation (i.e. quay space and quay crane capacity) for their paying
and demanding container line clients, but as a result the performance of the chain in
general suffers.
Secondly, there is the problem of information exchange. Respondents mention ‘ineffi-
cient’ container exchange and hinterland transport connectivity, and ‘uncertainty’ with
regard to arrival times of containers. Even if information that could help increase the
efficiency of operations is available to the terminal operator, it is not shared with other
parties to the extent that the chain in general benefits from it. The question remains to
what extent terminals possess complete and accurate information that could increase
efficiency if disseminated.
The third relevant barrier is supply chain complexity. Even if parties are working
together efficiently, the complex nature of the supply chain (or chains) could im-
pede chain integration in ports. On a small area and within a limited time window,
the container passes from carrier to terminal through customs to a hinterland
transport operator, a process that in itself is complex enough to streamline without
taking into account synchronization with parallel (and intertwining) activities of
other operators. This is not to say that cooperation is doomed to fail, but it should
be recognized that perfect efficiency may not be feasible.
Moreover, the terms used to identify the coordination problems are subjective and
relative by nature (inefficient and unreliable compared to what?). Therefore, concerning
inter-terminal cooperation, the comparisons discussed with our respondents are the
major ports nearby: Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Hamburg. Forwarders in particular
find the terminal cooperation in Rotterdam more problematic than elsewhere, even
stating that the situation regarding hinterland consolidation and inter-terminal ex-
change of containers has worsened compared to the past and to other ports. Addition-
ally, a carrier representative stated that “German terminals are better at cooperating
and dealing with inter-terminal container exchange,” and “rail services to the German
hinterland from Antwerp are more reliable.” On the other hand, representatives of the
Port of Rotterdam Authority noted that, overall, the Belgian and German ports are
generally not more efficient than Rotterdam. Moreover, the Port of Rotterdam has a
considerable advantage because of the proximity of its deep-sea terminals to the sea.
It could be a matter of perspective whether Rotterdam under- (or over-) performs.
However, it is shown that shippers and their agents evaluate a port’s performance
based on their own experience and adjust their port choice accordingly, so even a
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perception or reputation based on anecdotal evidence can have significant effects in
practice. The performance measures that are important to shippers are directly re-
lated to the effectiveness of intra-port cooperation. The analysis above suggests that
there are several coordination problems that could be addressed, relating to intra-port
cooperation and supply chain integration. This in turn depends on the extent to
which the inter-organizational relations in the port are conducive to cooperation; this
is discussed in the next section.
Institutional drivers of coordination problems
Having outlined how lacking cooperation undercuts port performance, this section
deals with the main impediments to intra-port cooperation. The interviewed stake-
holders’ perceptions of the drivers behind deficient cooperation are enumerated in
Table 2. Particularly regarding the perceived drivers of observable coordination
problems, it should be noted that our respondents speak from their own perspec-
tive, introducing subjectivity and potential bias into the analysis. We have juxta-
posed the perspectives of four different types of port stakeholders to obtain as
complete a picture as possible.
Several institutional (formal, informal, and economic) factors can be recognized
across the responses:
– Market conditions – notably consolidation and growing market power in the liner
sector and overcapacity at the Rotterdam terminals – put pressure on terminals on
the demand side to compete on costs
Table 2 Inventory of drivers of inter-terminal coordination problems, as identified by respondents
Forwarders Terminal operators Port Authority Carriers
Lack of willingness to
collaborate among
container terminals
Port Authority could take a
stronger role in mediating
between terminals
Delays at customs
produce additional
uncertainty
Lack of shared vision (‘The
great Rotterdam ideal’)
Lack of supply chain
visibility at terminals
Often delays at customs
(responsible for checking
and clearing containers at
the terminal)
Port Authority does not
recognize problems
stemming from
competitive focus and
unlevel playing field
Overcapacity gives carriers
leverage over terminals,
‘play out’ intra-port
competition to cut costs
Businesslike relations, Port
Authority emphasizes
competition, does little to
enforce cooperation
where needed
Consolidation in liner
shipping market puts
pressure on container
terminals
➔ More ad-hoc decision
making
➔ Competition intensifies
Pressure from carriers to
cut costs and increase
service flexibility on the
quayside
Recent port extension has
shaken up the stevedoring
sector. When market
settles again, relations will
return to normal
No performance
agreements between
terminals or between
terminals and hinterland
transporters
Initiatives to stimulate
cooperation are not
successful due to the
noncommittal nature of
agreements between
parties and lack of
enforcement
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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– Lack of supply chain visibility at terminals, reluctance to share information,
uncertainty introduced by customs procedures
– Low levels of trust and cooperative culture: intra-port relations are described as
‘arm’s length,’ ‘businesslike,’ and lacking a ‘shared vision’
– Absence of agreement on key issues and the noncommittal nature and lack of
enforcement of existing agreements.
Some differences in perspective can be observed between the various types of
stakeholders. Forwarder, terminal operator, and carrier representatives emphasize
their wish that the Port Authority would take a stronger stance in enforcing co-
operation when necessary, whereas respondents from the Port Authority tend to
emphasize market factors as the main driver behind lacking cooperation between
terminals. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but it is worth noting that
there are considerable differences in different actors’ perspectives with regard to
what is happening and why.
First, all respondents acknowledge the role of market conditions. As the liner ship-
ping business is consolidating through mergers, acquisitions, and alliance agreements –
the latest reshuffling as of April 2017 has concentrated the major carriers from four
into three alliances, representing over 80% of the global container trade – the market
power of carriers relative to terminals increases. This shows particularly on the quay-
side of terminals. One forwarder indicated that “carrier schedules become increasingly
volatile and ships may change terminals or leave while still unloading (so-called ‘cut
and run’ calls) on an ad-hoc basis” and that terminals have to deal with demands for
greater service flexibility towards the deep-sea lines. This can produce hold-up prob-
lems with customs, and for shippers and forwarders. A Port Authority representative
elaborated further on the supply side of the local freight market:
With the Tweede Maasvlakte and developments in the liner market, the terminal
market in Rotterdam has been disrupted, and it is still being settled who serves
which clients. This has intensified competition, but once the market settles back into
equilibrium and terminals are fully operational, relations and cooperation will return
to normal.
Secondly, lack of supply chain visibility at the terminal and uncertainty with re-
gard to customs procedures increase uncertainty for other chain actors and in-
crease inefficiency in container transfers. In this case, there is a “one-way flow of
process and planning” (Richey et al. 2010, p. 244): the terminal’s own constraints
determine planning and are not synchronized with the process and planning of
other actors. Internally at the terminal, customs procedures and their potential
waiting time introduce considerable uncertainty regarding container movements.
Also here, a unidirectional relationship exists in which the customs’ planning and
processes impose constraints on terminals’ integration with hinterland transport.
Third, at a more tacit level, there exists what our respondents call “a lack of the
‘Great Rotterdam’ feeling” (Port Authority) or “pure business,” and “arm’s length” rela-
tions (both carrier representatives). These statements derive from a comparison with
other major Northern European ports. As one carrier representative states, “In other
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ports, relations are more informal, less purely businesslike, and ad-hoc agreements are
easily made. [ …] Also the Port Authority adopts a more detached position than else-
where.” Referring to the theoretical background above, this is congruent with a lack of
trust and shared vision. In such circumstances, organizational boundaries are too con-
straining, and organizations are too internally focused to achieve the relational integration
that arises with truly cooperative relations. These social norms make inter-organizational
relations rather adversarial, negating the potential benefits from a coopetitive relation.
Most interviewees emphasize the need to reestablish good contact between stakeholders,
but at the same time this is an issue of secondary importance, with sub-optimization of
their own processes taking precedence.
Along the formal dimension of the institutional environment, our respondents iden-
tify – in various contexts – a lack of formal agreements between parties that have to
cooperate in container transfers. These include container terminals and customs, and
container terminals and hinterland transporters. More abstract, the lack of formal rela-
tions leads to an incongruence in performance measures between these parties, indu-
cing misalignment of incentives. One terminal representative identifies the cause of this
as “the interests and business models of terminals and [other stakeholders]” differing
considerably and not aligning well in many cases. A carrier representative gave the ex-
ample that a terminal – having the deep-sea carrier as its most important client – has
no direct contractual obligations with barge operators (also discussed by Van der Horst
and De Langen (2008)). These conditions are not unique to Rotterdam (e.g. Jaffee
2017) but may be particularly relevant in a context where informal relations between
supply chain actors are not conducive to cooperation either.
Having identified and conceptualized the main coordination problems in the Rotterdam
stevedoring sector, the next section discusses recommendations to improve supply chain
integration and discusses their applicability to the coordination problems outlined.
Implications and recommendations for improvement
Considering the impact that deficient coordination between neighboring container ter-
minals can have on the performance and competitiveness of seaports, several highly
relevant implications can be derived from the study findings for managers in the sector
as well as policymakers.
Freight market conditions are considered exogenous for this analysis: no strategy of
any of the surveyed port actors will significantly impact on the working of demand and
supply in the global freight market. Also, complete resolution of the inherent complex-
ity in container supply chains is likely not feasible. As discussed above, the various
interests and business models of all stakeholders involved diverge considerably, so one
overarching solution that fully satisfies all stakeholders is unlikely to be feasible. More-
over, we observed evidence of port coordination as a collective action problem. Nearly
all actors interviewed proposed solutions in which another party should take the lead
(e.g. “terminals should take hinterland transport more seriously,” “clearly the Port Au-
thority should take a leading role,” “carriers ask too much”) but which would be too
costly or risky for one actor alone to implement without guaranteed cooperation from
the others. Hence, if the institutional context stays the same, none of these proposed
improvements would materialize. Considering generic solutions (contracts, agreements,
regulations), as well as context-specific implementations of these, we discuss what
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stakeholders might do to improve cooperation and supply chain integration at port
level, in spite of a current deadlock situation.
Implications for management
Lack of visibility and uncertainty can be addressed through improved communication
and information exchange. Technically, this can be done using information technology,
in the case of seaports for example by extending the functionality of Port Community
Systems (Portbase for the Port of Rotterdam) and other platforms (such as Nextlogic
and Container Monitor). Similarly, better synchronization of container movements can
be achieved through information technology (IT) solutions. This, however, addresses
only the ‘hardware’ side of the problem. For a permanent improvement of chain inte-
gration, resources and capabilities are needed, and an informal institutional context
conducive to cooperation and integration (the ‘orgware’), including trust, commitment,
and – most importantly for IT solutions – a willingness to share information. If these
are implemented effectively, a positive feedback loop of performance improvement and
further integration can result.
On the organizational side, integration can be facilitated through several mecha-
nisms. First, these include incentive alignment and co-performance evaluation among
all stakeholders involved. In the case of a port, this could be achieved through more
formal arrangements between terminals and parties with whom they do not have a
direct contractual relationship. Considering hinterland transportation, a related con-
cept is already being explored by ECT in the Port of Rotterdam, through its European
Gateway Service, which arranges hinterland transport under the auspices of the ter-
minal operator. Although this vertically integrated solution is much appreciated by a
major carrier interviewed, it may not be feasible to arrange all hinterland transport
this way. Horizontally also, coordination may benefit from performance agreements
between terminals that impose boundaries on sub-optimization while incentivizing
cooperation. It remains a challenge, however, to incentivize terminals to make conces-
sions to the optimization of their own sub-processes, especially if it remains unclear
how the costs and benefits of coordination are shared.
Furthermore, several other types of collaborative schemes can be explored. These
include inter-organizational teams, risk and reward sharing, collaborative capability
building, and more advanced interdependent inter-organizational arrangements (Richey
et al. 2010). Referring again to agreements, integration may benefit from performance
agreements between terminals that provide mechanisms to share equitably the costs
and benefits of integration efforts and hence incentivize cooperation in areas where
it matters. Designated inter-organizational collaborative efforts can also facilitate in-
tegration. On a deeper level, informal institutions have to change to accommodate
these processes by establishing new social norms, greater levels of trust, and a gen-
eral awareness of shared interests – i.e. a united front. There may be significant
barriers to overcome before these changes can be effectuated, including underesti-
mation of the importance or relevance of greater integration, fear of losing control,
and key stakeholders’ short-term focus.
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) outline how a simultaneously competitive and co-
operative relationship can be effectively managed within an organization, providing
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lessons that are relevant for this case study. They argue that competitive and
cooperative inter-organizational relations are based on fundamentally different in-
stitutional logics. These can coexist within the same firm, as long as they do not
overlap across functions, which would cause ambiguity. Container terminals are a
typical example of firms that “are forced to interact with each other [in the same
sector], giving rise to rivalry and mutual dependence between them” (Bengtsson and
Kock 2000, p. 414). Like Richey et al. (2010), Bengtsson and Kock (2000, p. 419)
emphasize that the interaction should be governed by “clear norms [ …] partly
based on formal agreement and partly on social contracts [i.e. informal norms and
tacit agreement].” Their most relevant propositions relate to the separation of com-
petitive and cooperative logics of interaction within the firm, to be defined by the
closeness of an activity to the customer: in downstream activities, competition for
customers is warranted, whereas in upstream activities firms can benefit from co-
operation. An important condition for this coopetitive relation is that the logic of
inter-organizational interaction is not ambiguous within the same functional area.
For example, a unit engaging in a cooperative interaction with another firm should
not treat its counterpart as a competitor, for if it did, the cooperative effort would
not reach its fullest potential. The coexistence of cooperation and competition with
direct competitors should be internalized in the organizational culture. This places
a responsibility on higher management to refrain from ‘tribal’ or overly competitive
predispositions. Even if it is imperative for business areas not to balance incompat-
ible logics, it is imperative for management to do so effectively. Translating this to
the container-handling sector, this means that, even when terminals compete for
carriers’ business, there can be possibilities for cooperation in areas such as hinter-
land transport and transshipment.
Despite progress made in these directions, the inherent complexity of terminals’
operations may impose a limit on the extent to which integration is possible. This is for
an important part driven by the fact that the terminal’s quayside is of relevance both
competitively (terminals offer quay capacity to their client carriers) and cooperatively
(because of barge transport and transshipment). Particularly in relation to these com-
plex resource-allocation problems, performance agreements between terminal opera-
tors may serve to balance optimization of terminals’ own processes and integration
across terminals to some degree.
Implications for policymaking
Aside from these general recommendations, the case context also justifies some spe-
cific recommendations regarding port policy that can be considered by other ports in
similar situations. Two particular aspects of port policy are relevant in the case con-
text, namely concession and competition policy and port extension planning.
First, the Port Authority’s concession policy in this case imposed two important
conditions on the container terminals. By granting concessions to multiple firms
and inviting new entrants to compete with incumbents, the Port Authority stimu-
lated competition among the port’s terminal operators. Moreover, the additional
requirements included in the concession agreements for the Tweede Maasvlakte –
especially the modal split clause emphasizing hinterland transport by barge and rail
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– put pressure on terminals to cooperate and coordinate with their competitors. It
would serve Port Authorities well to consider the tension inherent in these goals
and take measures to better reconcile these – for example by attaching perform-
ance indicators to various areas in which cooperation is desirable.
Secondly, in the Rotterdam case study, the timing of the port extension was unfor-
tunate: when the new terminals became operational, the freight market was in a de-
pressed state, leading to overcapacity within the port. It was a smart move on the part
of the Port Authority not to push to fill all of the newly created land with terminals at
once. As a more general recommendation to Port Authorities in the process of exten-
sion, it would be wise to consider the possibility of creating overcapacity when the
state of the freight market at the time of the completion is less than favorable.
Another, more general suggestion, also made by forwarder, carrier, and terminal oper-
ator representatives is for the Port Authority to reconsider its role, and make more use
of its position ‘above the parties’ as a mediator and enforcer (as discussed by for
example Van der Lugt 2017). Such ‘neutral third party’ involvement may guide parties
to work towards incentive alignment and stimulate information sharing. At the infor-
mal institutional level, the Port Authority as a third party can help bridge differences
between stakeholders, facilitate communication, and take the lead in a process of com-
munity building. One forwarder in particular emphasized that Port Authorities could
do more to enforce cooperation: if agreements are too noncommittal and not enforced,
port performance suffers, hurting the interests of both the Port Authority and the port
users. This was also emphasized by one of the carriers, who stated that
[in Rotterdam] cooperation and negotiation between container terminals are weak,
and there is little pressure for improvement from the Port Authority, which takes on
a more detached position. In other ports, relations are more informal, less purely
businesslike.
Another forwarder has also seen positive shifts in the last few years: Port Authorities
in general, and particularly in Rotterdam, have started to move beyond the ‘landlord’
role and have become more active in bringing parties together and intermediating.
From this perspective, Port Authorities can add value by facilitating, and even enforcing
cooperation to smoothen coordination.
Recent developments
Recently, some initiatives have been undertaken in the Port of Rotterdam to address
the problems analyzed in this paper.
To better facilitate the exchange of containers between terminals, the Port Authority
has initiated a project to construct a ‘container exchange route’ (CER) – a dedicated
lane that directly connects the main deep-sea terminals in the port (Dijkhuizen 2018).
Using this lane, containers can be bundled and exchanged between terminals while
avoiding congested public roads. The CER is expected to start operating in 2020. Be-
yond infrastructure projects such as the CER, several other new developments show
the Port Authority in a more active role than expected from a traditional ‘landlord’ Port
Authority. An example of a more leading role in community building is the Global
Ports Group, a cooperative arrangement between the Port of Rotterdam Authority and
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four major terminal operating companies (Pieffers 2016). The agreement specifies “in-
formation sharing [ …] and coordination of joint activities with regard to the efficiency
and effectiveness of the container port industry” (quote translated from Pieffers (2016)).
Sharing capacity with large call sizes is also said to be being explored. Although this
initiative is only a recent phenomenon, some crucial coordination issues can be ad-
dressed. First, it signals a commitment to cooperation and an awareness of shared
interests. Second, the involvement of the Port Authority as a neutral party may be
a way in which commitment and fairness can be enforced. Moreover, a formalized
and transparent arrangement with the involvement of a neutral public actor can
address competition law implications of cooperation between competitors (Lalkens
2016). Another example is Nextlogic (Nextlogic 2018), a cooperation of numerous
market actors, including terminal operators, depots, and barge operators, in which
the Port Authority also participates. Nextlogic aims for a central platform to co-
ordinate barge calls across container terminals within the Port of Rotterdam. This
initiative combines elements of several of the general solutions discussed above,
including technology-based information exchange to reduce uncertainty and ineffi-
ciency, and more formal arrangements between horizontally and vertically linked
organizations. The market has also offered several digital platform-based solutions,
such as TEUbooker and 4shipping, to better align demand and supply of hinter-
land transportation capacity. However, because they focus on matching shippers
and hinterland transporters, these initiatives may do little to address the lack of
coordination at terminals.
It should be noted that these developments are still fairly new. In light of the theoret-
ical considerations and the analysis of the issues within the port, these have the poten-
tial to address persistent issues, but as of now they are too new and operating at too
small a scale to gauge their benefits to the actors involved. It is to be expected that
their effectiveness in the long run will depend on actors’ trust, commitment, and will-
ingness to share information.
Discussion
Having discussed at length the implications of the study findings for practice, some re-
marks are in order regarding the implications for research and the limitations of the
study. In line with the three research questions formulated in the introduction, this
study set out to understand the implications and drivers of coordination problems
stemming from conflicting pressures for competition and cooperation imposed on con-
tainer terminals and to offer suggestions on how to overcome these. To our knowledge,
this study is the first to explore in depth the linkages between the institutional context,
inter-organizational relations, behaviour and port performance. In doing so, this study
contributes several new insights to existing knowledge, with useful implications for aca-
demic research as well as port policy and management. Multiple coordination problems
were identified and traced back to institutional barriers to supply chain integration and
collaboration. The urgent need to address these issues is illustrated by examples of how
these barriers impact port competitiveness in terms of port users’ port choices. Regard-
ing the various areas for improvement (as discussed above), a general conclusion is that
‘hardware’ (resources and capabilities) alone cannot achieve effective chain integration,
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but that integration would require the presence of ‘orgware’ (institutions) conducive to
healthy coopetitive relations with both competitive and cooperative interaction.
For the field of port management research, the study findings highlight the import-
ance of horizontal coordination for port performance. This adds to the observations of
Van der Horst and De Langen (2008) – who focused predominantly on vertical coord-
ination – and affirms their conjecture that cooperation seldom arises spontaneously.
Particularly in the case of direct competitors, development of formal and informal gov-
ernance mechanisms is required to adequately balance conflicting pressures. From both
the coopetition and the supply chain integration perspective, an important precondition
is the creation of a cooperative culture. Formal governance mechanisms alone, priori-
tizing competition and arm’s length transactions, are not enough to resolve the coord-
ination problems stemming from terminals’ ambiguous position with regard to one
another. Lacking necessary informal institutions, change has to come either from a ‘first
mover’ among the market parties involved or from a non-market third party – the Port
Authority. This study also highlights the relevance of insights from the supply chain co-
ordination and coopetition literature to understand and potentially address persistent
inter-organizational issues in port clusters. The link between governance, market
forces, behavior, inter-organizational relations, and ultimately port performance is still
seldomly researched in the academic literature, and this study highlights the relevance
of these linkages and their working in the case context under study.
This last point also pertains to one of the study’s limitations. This being a case study
within a specific port context, the findings might not be directly generalizable to other
seaport contexts. The theoretical underpinnings of the findings, i.e. the conceptual cat-
egories of barriers and facilitators of integration, however, have proven to be effective
in achieving a deep understanding of inter-firm coordination problems. In other cases
where these problems arise, these barriers and facilitators may be relevant to differing
degrees. But it is important to emphasize that the conceptual framework itself can be
adapted to different case contexts. Another important limitation of this study is that
unfortunately the approach does not lend itself well for quantification. Therefore it is
not possible to compare the relative impact of different issues (which would be useful
in prioritizing interventions) or an assessment of costs and benefits of various solu-
tions, but this research can serve as a starting point to develop new approaches. There-
fore, future research can be geared towards this analysis of different cooperative
schemes, for example using game theory.
Conclusions
The findings from this study illustrate the complex relation between competitive and
cooperative behavior within seaport clusters. Ostensibly, this tension between competi-
tion and cooperation requires a balancing act or a single choice of one logic of inter-
action over the other – as the title of the paper suggests. The study shows that for port
performance, it rather matters in which logistics functions lacking cooperation due to
competitive pressures leads to problems. In these areas, specific steps can be taken to
resolve the tensions inherent to cooperation between competitors. Logistical problems
resulting from deficient coordination between competing terminals in a port area are a
persistent problem for container ports, and our study findings provide new insights that
can help policymakers and managers understand and resolve these issues. As discussed
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above, the findings from this study invite questions for further research in various
areas, even beyond the integration of supply chain processes between terminals. In par-
ticular, the study raises several considerations for port governance and policymaking.
Port authorities’ concession and competition policy can be fine-tuned to mitigate hold-
up due to competitive pressure. Moreover, it can be concluded that the role of a port
extension and overcapacity in the case context underlines the need for Port Authorities
to consider freight market conditions in their strategic decision-making with regard to
port extensions and the granting of new concessions. Earlier research has already iden-
tified an evolution of Port Authorities’ role beyond the traditional ‘landlord’ model,
including that of a community manager and platform leader (e.g. Hollen et al. 2015).
This study provides further suggestions for directions in which Port Authorities may
utilize their position to help create value for port users and the port in general. Ultim-
ately, the goal is to function efficiently as a port, but this is underpinned by more tacit
factors related to inter-organizational relations that can have a critical influence on the
value-creating process in a port. A key step for future research is to more adequately
trace and measure these processes, perhaps based on Allee’s (2008) ‘value network’
approach. One key consideration for future work that this study offers is another direc-
tion in which to look to broaden the view on how ports create value.
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